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Bernard Lonergan’s Promise for Educational Philosophy
Ivan Gaetz
Library Director
Colorado College
(ivan.gaetz@coloradocollege.edu)
Abstract
Philosopher and theologian, Bernard Lonergan, S.J., regarded as one of the most influential Jesuit thinkers of
the twentieth century, focused primarily on cognitional theory, epistemology and metaphysics. His system of
thought known as “intentionality analysis” has been applied widely to many fields of study, including
education. While Lonergan directly addressed certain issues in education and educational philosophy, his
thought has greater promise for educational philosophy through broader application, specifically in ordering
and expanding educational themes related to the four key differentiations of consciousness he expounds. The
differentiations are explained as distinct but interrelated levels of consciousness and consist of experiencing,
understanding, judging and deciding. For educational philosophy, “experiencing” draws attention to the vast
array of sensory input, affectivity and the experience of ideas. “Understanding” brings to light the questioning
process that seeks intelligibility for human experience, direct and indirect, where the processes and
achievements of intelligence become the focus. “Judging” concerns questions of the good, the right and the
true, and provides an expanded context of critical thinking and reasonableness encompassing knowledge of
not only the world but also of oneself. “Deciding” wrestles with the existential questions of life and
promotes responsible living expressed in moral agency, social justice, service to one’s communities, and
engaged citizenship. More than adding new educational theory or pedagogical innovation (though these may
result with further practical application of intentionality analysis), the promise of Lonergan’s thought for
education philosophy appears as a larger framework for deep thinking about education that distinguishes
important themes and concerns and interrelates them to a comprehensive and open-ended horizon that
champions human potentials for attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility.
Introduction
Bernard Lonergan, S.J., is considered by some to
be one of the greatest Jesuit thinkers of the
twentieth century. He is also thought to be in the
top tier of Jesuit intellectuals since their founding
in 1540. Others have compared Lonergan to Saint
Thomas Aquinas and to Immanuel Kant in terms
of intellectual reach and profundity. George
Whelan, S.J., professor of theology at the
Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome offers a
concise summary of his celebrated life and work.
Bernard Lonergan was a Canadian Jesuit who
lived from 1904 to 1984. He was a
philosopher and theologian and he is mostly
known for two seminal works: Insight (1957)
and Method in Theology (1972). He was both a
student and a professor at the Pontifical
Gregorian University in Rome and also taught
in Montreal, Boston and Toronto. During the

1970s he was featured on the cover of Time
magazine and he was “considered one of the
finest philosophic thinkers of the twentieth
Century,” and in a recently published book,
Twentieth Century Catholic Thinkers by Fergus
Kerr, he makes the top ten list formulated by
this author of the most important Catholic
thinkers of the last century.1
As a theologian, Lonergan did not adapt any
particular philosophical system of thought or
theoretical constructs for theological purposes–as
did, for instance, Karl Rahner using Martin
Heidegger or Pierre Teilhard de Chardin
employing evolutional theory and physics. Rather,
he sought to develop a new mode of philosophy
that would place theological inquiry on a sound,
productive, collaborative, methodological
footing—mirroring in certain ways empirical
method and perhaps its successes. While
Lonergan’s immediate focus was on theological
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method, he discovered a more general method
that also applies to scholarship within the
humanities. To be sure, there are profound
differences in scientific and humanist studies. For
instance, you cannot put human justice in a petri
dish and study it through repeatable
experimentation, and how one “feels” about
RU(44), Ruthenium, is of little concern to the
scientist. Essentially, the difference pertains to
what is studied. But are there general structures
and processes of scientific empirical inquiry that
relate to and inform inquiry in the humanities? To
answer this question, Lonergan probed the basic
nature of scientific inquiry, and then from this he
developed what came to be known as a
“generalized empirical method,” and subsequently
“intentionality analysis.” His central focus
became, not what is studied, but the nature of
study itself, the nature of inquiry and human
understanding.
The essay expresses my contention that
Lonergan’s work constructing a new mode of
philosophy based on the nature and processes of
human inquiry, along with its resulting general
methodology, has particular relevance to the field
of educational philosophy. I attempt to build the
case for this application of Lonergan’s method,
presented as “intentionality analysis,” by situating
and interrelating within this framework some great
themes of educational theory and practice, past
and present, and suggest that this holds particular
promise for a new, comprehensive educational
philosophy.2
First, however, I offer a caveat. This essay is not
really for the seasoned Lonergan scholar who may
be inclined to engage the intricacies of
hermeneutics in deciphering precise meanings of
words and phrases Lonergan uses, if and how they
may have changed over his writing career, whether
or not, for instance, there is a fifth level in the
differentiations of consciousness, or how
Lonergan’s thought can inform the finer points of
theology and cognate disciplines. While these are
engaging, animating, and perhaps needed
clarifications or developments in Lonergan’s
thought, many educators generally do not have the
background, nor the time or the patience for this
type of investigation and conversation. This essay
aims to introduce educators to Lonergan’s grand
vision and seeks to help practitioners glimpse

simply some possibilities for their own thinking
and approach in education. Educators tend to be
pragmatists—there is a job to do, and an
important one at that, and the “tools” one uses in
the classroom, in the seminar, online or on
campus, need to be readily grasped and effectively
wielded. My hope is that this essay will help in
that grasping and wielding, and that more
practitioners in the field of educational practice
and theory may benefit from his great mind.
What I endeavor to do, then, is to present a basic,
hopefully clear, and relatively concise account of
key ideas Lonergan espouses along with the
system of thought for which he is known. These
basic ideas and system of thought hold promise
for reconstituting educational philosophy and for
informing so much of what happens in the
classroom. But in aiming at what is basic and
relatively simple I do not suggest Lonergan’s work
is simplistic. Quite the opposite; it is profound
and radical. But I maintain that realizing some
effect of Lonergan’s thought in how we
understand and engage teaching and learning
processes can be obtained rather quickly, even
though “mastering the instrument” of Lonergan’s
full-fledged system of thought and gaining its full
effect constitutes a project requiring deep-level
attention and commitment over a lifetime.
Some may believe that “a little of Lonergan goes a
long way,” including perhaps even a few of his
fellow Jesuits. However, in very helpful ways, a
little of Lonergan can go a long way. One needs to
grasp but a few key ideas, a few principles,
understand them in terms of one’s own interiority,
and then start to follow the leads by way of a few
basic “imperatives,” as Lonergan calls them, for
the effect to take hold and for his thought
potentially to be life enriching and even
transforming. By way of introduction, I will begin
by profiling Lonergan, the philosopher and
theologian, and then offer some general
assessments of his work. This will lead to a brief
account of some of the broad mindscape of
educational philosophy. This rather lengthy
introduction, lengthy because many will not have
much background in educational philosophy or
the thought of Lonergan, then leads to an
explanation of the key elements of Lonergan’s
philosophy and in very general terms how these
can direct and inform deep thinking about
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education. The essay concludes with a general
assessment of Lonergan’s thought for educational
philosophy and in what ways I believe this holds
promise for educational philosophy.
Lonergan the Philosopher
As a scholar, Lonergan drew on a variety of
thought in philosophy, science, mathematics,
history and religion, as well as the Greek and
medieval classics. His scholarship was wellengaged in contemporary fields of philosophy of
science, historicism, and existentialism.
Throughout his work, Lonergan situated various
philosophies and systems of thought within an
integrated framework where key ideas from the
great Western intellectual tradition contribute to
an enlarging and ultimately comprehensive
worldview. As a philosopher, he sought to create
a radical mode of philosophical inquiry that brings
together and expands insight on the nature of
human experience, the nature of understanding,
the structure and operations of human
discernment and judgment, to an account of the
existential moment of decision and of how
persons seek to make their way in the world.
Aspects of his reconstruction of philosophy are
well-presented by philosopher, Hugo Meynell in
his book, Redirecting Philosophy: Reflections on the
Nature of Knowledge from Plato to Lonergan.3
In addition to his achievements in philosophy,
Lonergan also was a noted theologian. Bringing
together these two fields of study, theology and
philosophy, he wrote a major treatise on human
cognitional theory, epistemology and metaphysics
called, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding.4
Completed in 1953, but first published in 1957,
this work established Lonergan as a major thinker
of the 20th century (although his thought still does
not garner the wide attention it perhaps deserves).
The conviction becomes clear in Insight that the
study of human inquiry and knowledge, the field
of inquiry called “epistemology,” shows that
understanding and knowing are basic to human
beings and deeply affects how we carve out our
existence in the world. Lonergan has become
known for this epithet, “thoroughly understand
what it is to understand, and not only will you
understand the broad lines of all there is to be
understood but also you will possess a fixed base,
an invariant pattern, opening upon all further

developments of understanding.”5 Insight explores
and answers three basic questions: What does one
do when one knows? Why is doing that called
knowing? What does one know when that is
done? Answers to these questions constitute
Lonergan’s cognitional theory, his epistemology
and his metaphysics.
Lonergan the Theologian
In Insight, Lonergan focused on the processes of
understanding and resulting methodology across a
broad spectrum of human inquiry, then in
subsequent writings he explored theological
methodology in particular. Insight showed that the
human mind—understood in terms of human
consciousness—has distinct levels and operations.
These levels and operations most properly work in
distinct but integrated ways as persons comes to
experience the world, interpret and understand
that world, comes to grasp what counts as
knowledge (both in terms of probabilities and
correct judgments), and then decides to act (or not
act) in accord with that knowledge. He came to
regard human consciousness as a patterned set of
operations that produce increments of personal
and collective knowledge, and that insight and
knowledge amass cumulatively. Lonergan showed
that human consciousness, basically and optimally,
tends to unfold methodologically even though we
may not explicitly understand or acknowledge that
method. However, the more we understand and
better engage consciousness as a patterned and
cumulatively progressive operation, the more
“methodological” we become and, increasingly,
we become more effective, productive, caring and
loving, authentic human beings. It is important to
note that the method Lonergan elucidates in not
at all like a recipe or an assembly-line production.
Rather, it is a matter of understanding and of
drawing on the power and potentialities—the
intentionalities—of our own consciousness.
How, then, does this relate to theology? Can the
actual structure and operations of human
consciousness, as Lonergan maps them out, direct
one’s mode of theological inquiry? To this he
answered, “Yes,” in his most widely influential
book, Method in Theology, published in 1972.6
Following some preliminary chapters on method,
the human good, history, and related topics, he
developed a new way to “do” theology. His
theological method unfolds in eight “functional
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specialties” that pertain to broad disciplines in
theology—four conducted primarily by the
academic (who may or may not be a person of
faith) and four by the theologian committed to a
particular religious tradition. These are: research,
interpretation, history, and dialectics—the first
four, and then foundations, doctrines, systematics,
and communications—the last four. Not only
does his methodology endeavor to order and
direct theological inquiry in a methodological
manner, that is, as a “normative pattern of
recurrent and related operations yielding
cumulative and progressive results,” but also it
provides a framework for more intentional
interplay of academic inquiry and of theological
collaboration.
General Assessment of Lonergan’s Thought
In my estimation, Lonergan’s vision was as grand
as de Chardin’s in terms of understanding the
cosmos, and as existential as Rahner’s in coming
to terms with “being” in its human dimensions. It
seems to me, however, that Lonergan was far
more rigorous than de Chardin or Rahner, or
many others for that matter, in addressing a larger
scope of related fundamental questions and, in the
process, he achieved more profound results. One
issue of Newsweek in the 1970s explained, “Jesuit
Philosopher Bernard Lonergan has set out to do
for the twentieth century what even Aquinas could
not do for the thirteenth…Insight has become a
philosophic classic comparable in scope to
Hume’s Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding.”7
John Macquarrie, a widely influential theologian of
the last half of the 20th century, offers his
assessment as well. “[Lonergan’s] massive work,
Insight, reminds one of Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason or Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind because it
works through the various levels of mental
operation from the simplest to the most complex
and leaves one with an extraordinarily impressive
picture of the power and energy of the human
intellect.”8 Clearly, Lonergan was, and remains, an
important thinker as evident today by the many
Lonergan institutes and centers around the world.9
I believe Lonergan, like many great intellectuals,
has something significant to contribute to
conversation on education. If we take a little time
to begin to come to terms with some of
Lonergan’s key assertions, it could be worth the

effort by having expanded and deepened our
understanding of what we do in education and,
more importantly, as Parker Palmer suggests, to
grasp more deeply who we are as human-beingsas-educators.10
Lonergan’s Thought for Educational
Philosophy
Lonergan was no stranger to the field of
educational philosophy. Although this field of
study was not his main focus by any means, like
many great thinkers—Michael Oakeshott,
Northrop Frye, and even Friedrich Nietzsche and
Immanuel Kant, as examples—he was asked from
time to time to address issues related to education
and educational philosophy. The most noted
occasion for Lonergan was a series of lectures he
delivered at Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio
in 1959. Insight was already into a second edition,
and Lonergan was making his mark nationally and
internationally. On this occasion he addressed
educators over several days on matters related to
Dewey’s and Piaget’s work on education, but also
presented his own thought on ethics, art and
history, among other topics. The lectures were
tape recorded, transcribed, and then published in
1988 as Volume 10, Topics in Education, of the
Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan.11
As the title suggests, the book consists of a set of
topics addressed by Lonergan, and while
philosophical in nature, he did not intend to
present a “philosophy of education” where deep
level, systematic and comprehensive accounts of
education unfold. He ended his first of ten
lectures with this proviso and invitation:
I am not a specialist in education, but I
have suffered under educators for very
many years, and I have been teaching
for an equally long time …. [Y]ou can
listen to me as I speak about
philosophy and its relation to theology
and to concrete living. But most of the
concrete applications, the ironing out
of the things, will have to be done by
you who are in the fields of education
and philosophy of education.12
The application of Lonergan’s thought, then, in
this essay consists of an effort in the “ironing out
of things” that intends to inform a philosophy of
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education. What I am after here is not a full
blown account of the breadth and richness of
Lonergan’s thought as it relates to the broad
spectrum of education and educational
philosophy. To do this, one would need to
encounter the full scope of his thought
throughout the projected 25 volumes of his
Collected Works. Rather, I present a basic
understanding of his key assertions, what they
generally could mean and how they hold promise
for education.
“Educational philosophy” may be a mode of
thinking not often engaged by many educators,
including educators in higher education, since
many college and university professors have never
taken a course or read much in “educational
studies” or in educational philosophy. So let us
consider briefly some key elements of an
educational philosophy. In simple terms,
educational philosophy addresses the more
profound, deep-level matters related to teaching
and learning that cover a wide range of topics
from epistemology, ethics, and citizenship to
personal formation and development, social
concerns, and “new thinking” as this comes to
bear on the theory and practice of education.
Recent examples of new thinking explores various
kinds of “intelligences,” “knowledge ascriptions,”
and “human capabilities.”13 Educational
philosophy helps educators think deeply, critically,
and creatively about the big issues related to
human emotional and intellectual development, as
well as to existential and social life, and helps
educators—and ultimately the persons being
educated (one hopes)—relate these issues and
resulting assertions and affirmations to one’s basic
values and commitments. While practitioners and
administrators in the field of education wrestle
with real problems in the classroom, in the
seminar, the conference auditorium and the office,
educational philosophy can help educators raise
the eyes from the road immediately afoot to
consider the longer view, the greater good, a
better way, and the ultimate consequences. It is
my contention that Lonergan can help one engage
these types of reflections and help move one
along the exciting journey of educational
philosophy.
For Lonergan, philosophical thinking and the
construction of a credible philosophy depend

fundamentally on an account of human
consciousness. Without a clear and accurate grasp
of what is going on in our own patterns and
operations of consciousness, he claims, we simply
are left to muddle through as best we can, living
essentially in a world of extroversion (or what
Lonergan calls “naïve realism”), struggling with
confusing or wrong-headed ideas about culture
and society, about human life and what it means
to be human, or avoiding these types of questions
altogether, and ultimately ending up with
problematic ideas about what counts as “the
good,” the “true” and “reality” itself. Ascribing to
some version of naïve realism with its common
expressions in various forms of “pragmatism,” we
can get by in education, sure enough, but it is very
difficult to make substantive, fully satisfying
progress in sorting through the complex and
profound issues that face us today. In the end, the
naïve realist may very likely end up being
inadequate to meet deep challenges facing our
society and culture, or, as philosopher José Ortega
y Gasset suggests, unable to “mount to the level
of one’s time.”14 Rather, we may tend to rise to
the “level of our incompetence.” At best,
understanding life’s big issues and relating them to
the grand enterprise of education would be “hit
and miss,” or more likely to be a matter largely
avoided.
Merely Muddling Through
Compared to an engagement with philosophy and
the “big” questions, education today often seems
to be a matter of “muddling through,” of chasing
after this or that trend in popular culture and
technology, of merely responding to immediate
problems rather than taking the lead and
articulating matters of deep concern and of
enduring importance in society and education.
For instance, in 2013 and 2014, public discourse
on educational issues focused much on a “core
curriculum” and whether or not in American
communities, regions or states should adopt this
standard. While achieving basic literacies is
important, where is the concern for educating for
democracy, for citizenship, for contributing to the
common good, or for living an authentic life?
One wonders if educators and administrators tend
to be led by issues defined by others, politicians in
particular, issues such as “discipline,” “standards,”
“back-to-basics,” “no child left behind,” “values
clarification,” “ethics,” “computer literacy,”
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“social media,” as examples of topics that have
commanded attention over the past several years.
Clearly, these concerns have some importance, but
with the educational agenda set largely by politics
and the public purse, educators today tend not to
be in the vanguard but rather left lagging behind
and responding to politicians, media personalities
or various community groups. Response, of
course, is important, but others tend to set the
agenda. Driven by politics, by budget constraints,
by the winds of immediate community concern,
administrators and leading educators seem less
able to draw on well-developed, overarching,
systematic modes of thought to fully understand,
assess, and decide on these issues in an integrative,
comprehensive and fully satisfying way. When
educators are compelled to respond to myriad
issues that detract from ultimate concerns in
education, at most we can hope simply to
“muddle through,” aiming merely to see students
graduate with acceptable grades, hoping they make
the best of things in the real world. This
characterization may be overly pessimistic and
rather limited, and no doubt there are many
individual examples that represent hope for
positive change in educational theory and practice.
My point simply is to draw attention to some of
the problems facing education today, including the
paucity of deep-level thinking on these problems,
and suggest that we can obtain that deep-level
thinking by aid of Lonergan and that we find
promise in Lonergan by rethinking educational
philosophy in certain ways. Taking the time and
effort to consider the larger, deeper questions in
education can help educators attain a clearer
vision of the enterprise of education, and that in
Lonergan there is promise to transcend the
“muddling through” approaches to achieve that
higher viewpoint that can profoundly affect
education in good ways—both for the teacher and
the student.
The noted Canadian historian, philosopher, and
intellectual, George Grant, offered his insight on
the state of education in the West during the last
half of the 20th century.
Mass technological education took place in
North America increasingly in large and
powerful institutions, which produced
rudderless people who have never been taught
to think deeply about the philosophical and

theological traditions of the West. … However,
it will be necessary to replace the training for
attention with education so that life did not
become a ‘frittering away in listless and
increasingly perverted pleasures.’ Mass leisure
without mass education can obviously only
lead to disaster. Even mass leisure with flaccid
mass education will lead to disaster.15
Working within the realm of secular higher
education, Grant offered something of a
surprising solution.
Education, and especially adult education,
ought to lead, in the words … attributed to St.
Augustine, out of the shadows and imaginings
into truth: after all, the man we call supremely
free was sufficiently maladjusted to his
community to die on the cross, and there is no
reason to believe we are so much better than
the people who put him to death. Education is
to take men to the unlimited, where there is no
security, no rest and no peace—except perhaps
… the peace that passes all understanding.16
Perhaps Grant’s analyses are rather dated in the
education environment of today, but there may be
a timeless aspect to them in calling for recognition
of a certain enduring aim of education—to take
persons “to the unlimited.” For Lonergan, the
unlimited emerges in the unfettered transcendental
operations of human consciousness and, in my
view, this is central to education.
It is such an approach to education—really a
philosophy of education—that transcends the
mundane and can transform one’s life in the most
profound ways. On balance, though, the
“muddling through” approach can sometimes
have its successes. Educators may get some of the
big issues right, may latch onto brilliance and
make a positive difference. But is there a way to
improve the balance sheet? Is there a way better to
ensure more hits and fewer misses?
I assert that Lonergan’s philosophy and general
methodology holds promise for a better way.
While Jesuit-based institutions of higher learning
have done little to mine the riches of Lonergan’s
thought for its educational programs, and certainly
there has been virtually nothing along this line
within secular education, there could be significant

Jesuit Higher Education 4(1): 5-26 (2015)

10

Gaetz: Lonergan’s Promise
benefits should the mining begin. Lonergan can
help achieve more fully the mission of Jesuit
higher education not only in striving more
intentionally toward an integration and a
wholeness in our knowing, doing, being,
caring/loving, but, more importantly, in bringing
to light and “appropriating” in better ways the
operations of knowing and the dynamism of
human consciousness. To be sure, there are
various Jesuit “tools” to accomplish this, such as
what is presented in the publication, Teaching to the
Mission: A Compendium of the Ignatian Mentoring
Program. This good, practical and insightful
document constitutes a step in the right direction.
But it still is not a philosophy of education per se in
that it does not probe the philosophical level very
deeply. What underlies this fine work, rather, is
the Jesuit “mission,” which has philosophical
connections, of course, but does not consist of a
full-fledged philosophy that comes to terms with
the various dimensions of education at the radical
levels needed.17
Applications of Lonergan’s thought promises a
philosophy of education that encounters the big
issues, corrects attempts at “muddling through,”
and excavates the mission-driven approach to
deeper levels. Lonergan offers a thoroughgoing
and, in my view, convincing18 account of human
consciousness in its various parts and operations
that direct one’s knowing, doing, being and
caring/loving. In general terms, this type of
illumined consciousness largely constitutes our
identity as persons. As Charles Taylor argues, such
elements of “inwardness” serve to create our
“sense of self.”19 A Lonerganian approach to
education, I believe, can help educators realize
greater potential as knowers by more intentionally
building on the worlds of experience, but then
going beyond personal experience to map out
how, in general terms, we become shapers of our
world in all the good, better and best ways
possible. This I perceive the promise of
Lonergan’s grand philosophical vision for
education.
Elements of a Lonerganian Philosophy of
Education
What are the elements of this philosophical vision
and how do these elements operate in education?
Briefly, they consist of an account of human
knowing and an interpolation of this account as a

general methodology that informs and guides
stages and processes of teaching and learning.
While Lonergan’s approach rises from the rich
Jesuit tradition of education, I emphasize that
applications of this epistemology and
methodology are not so restricted. Lonergan’s
insights and assertions can be (and are) applied to
a wide scope of human inquiry and learning where
reason and openness are key values and
aspirations.
A Lonergan-inspired vision of education focuses
on the individual, but it does not espouse a pure
subjectivism or an entrenched individualism. Its
higher aim is the enhancement and development
of communities, of societies, and of civilization
itself. The purpose of a Lonerganian educational
philosophy, I maintain, is not self-enclosure, but
self-transcendence. Its aim is to grasp true
knowledge wherever it is found, and builds upon a
desire for what Lonergan calls a “finality” of
human existence arising from a constant striving
toward the “higher viewpoint,” to grasp in ever
greater degrees deeper dimensions of reality.
Lonergan provides a way for education to achieve
what Grant calls taking persons “into the
unlimited.”
How does one tap into this vision? How does
one begin to draw on its potential and promise?
Essentially, through self-understanding and selfknowledge the pathway Lonergan charts opens
and expands further in exploring one’s own
“interiority.” In the process, one comes to know
oneself, a human subject, in a new way. The way
Lonergan suggests involves four basic “interior”
operations of the human subject that unfold on
four distinct but related “levels” of consciousness.
Three pertain to the question of knowing, and the
fourth pertains to the question of action, the
existential question, “What am I going to do about
what I know?”
The four basic operations yield knowledge and
embrace decisions that meet the existential
demand that all human beings be attentive, be
intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, and be
caring and loving. Simply put, the four basic
operations are experiencing, understanding,
judging and deciding. Developing this in more
detail, a brief account of these operations is
presented and a few reflections on education are
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offered that indicate what promise these
differentiated but interrelated levels and
operations hold in framing big issues in education
and in unfolding as a philosophy of education.
One important clarification needs to be made,
however. While Lonergan presents his discoveries
and analyses of how human consciousness
operates, an aim of Lonergan for those who
encounter his thought is to discover such
operations of their own consciousness. The most
important thing is not what Lonergan says about
this or that aspect of human consciousness or
what other thinkers assert about the world of
human “interiority.” Rather, the crucially
important questions concern you, the individual,
you the educator, you the learner. Lonergan’s
work thus unfolds as an invitation to selfdiscovery and to self-knowledge.
This crucially important point was stressed by
Lonergan’s chief promoter and colleague,
Frederick E. Crowe, S.J., in a Festschrift presented
to Lonergan and published by Continuum in 1964.
Crowe states in his introductory article, “The
Exigent Mind,”
Lonergan’s position is that the way to
understand him is to carry out for ourselves the
performance of appropriating conscious
activity. He has said as much in Insight, he has
repeated it for years in his lectures, and his
claim is ignored, sometimes as much by
disciples as by opponents, both of whom turn
more readily to the objective products of his
thought than to their own operations. Those
products command respect and deserve
discussion (otherwise this collection of studies
[in the Festschrift] would lose much of its
purpose) but they just are not the main issue.20
By my observation, this point tends to be missed
often in the expanding field of “Lonergan
Studies,” the point being that all of this is not so
much about Lonergan as it is about you, the
knowing, loving human subject, and about you,
the educator. Again, in developing an educational
philosophy that draws on Lonergan, then, the
main issue becomes self-discovery and selfknowledge. Moreover, the beginning point does
not consist of throwing out everything that one
has gained thus far in terms of self-knowledge, but

unfolds as a rethinking, a reconsideration and
perhaps even a transformation of self-knowledge
that can take you, as an educator, you as a thinker
about educational philosophy, to greater heights
and to deeper depths in personal and professional
achievement.
Differentiations of Consciousness and
Elements of Educational Philosophy
Simply put, Lonergan discovered that human
consciousness—the interior self that constitutes
one’s “spirituality”—consists of four basic
operations: experiencing, understanding, judging
(also called discerning),21 and deciding. It is
relatively easy to identify occasions where one has
experienced, understood, judged, or decided. Take
a few moments to reflect on how you have
engaged these activities over the past day, within
the past hour, or even within the past few
moments. As you reflect on these events, you
may be able to identify different focuses in your
consciousness as being mainly about one of these
four activities. In Lonergan’s analysis, these
operations of consciousness are also called
“intentionality” – what predominantly is occurring
in your consciousness in terms of what you are
“really after” in any particular occasion—an
experience, an understanding, a discernment or
judgment, or a decision.
However, things can quickly become complicated
as we reflect more deeply. When we try to
understand something, for example, we realize it
does not occur in isolation. Experience relates to
the effort to understand, as do previous
discernments and judgments, and past actions. In
fact, as you reflect on the various acts of your own
consciousness, you may realize they tend to occur
as single unified event that have many or all of the
other elements of consciousness operating
simultaneously to greater or lesser degrees. Thus,
the ability to make these differentiations within an
event may be a little more difficult—perhaps quite
challenging, in fact. What aspects of an event are
regarded as “experiencing”?; what elements
pertain to “understanding”?; what considerations
of an event can be attributed to efforts at
“discerning” and “judging”?; and what precisely
constitutes our “deciding”? While the four
operations are easy to grasp intellectually, it’s more
daunting actually to make these differentiations in
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the moments and events that constitute our living
in the real world.
Lonergan calls us to make these differentiations in
our own lives that then lead to the question of
applying these types of differentiations regarding
human “intentionality” to educational philosophy.
In what follows, each of these differentiations is
considered and suggestions made as to how
various philosophical concerns in education may
accordingly be differentiated. I consider first,
experiencing, second, understanding, followed by
discerning/judging, and then deciding. Again, this
does not lead to a full-fledged educational
philosophy, but rather indicates that promise
Lonergan’s thought holds for developing a
thoroughgoing philosophy of education.
Experiencing
As conscious, sentient human beings we have
experiences and, as such, experiences of all kinds
come flooding into consciousness. It’s not just
sensory experience (hearing, seeing, and so forth)
but experiences of mental images, feelings and
thoughts—higher level experiences that tend to be
more significant—experiences that Dewey called
“educationally valuable.” In fact, for Lonergan,
the role of mental images and “imagination” are
seen to play an enormously important role in what
constitutes human experience. Another way to
think about experiences is to regard them as
“data.” Lonergan regards all experiences as data—
data of sense and data of consciousness—that
include not only things presented to us via sensory
perceptions but also our thoughts and feelings
about these sense data. On a purely experiential
level, consciousness remains somewhat
undeveloped, constantly receiving and creating all
sorts of data, good or bad, significant or trivial,
from the world external to ourselves and from the
inner world of feelings and thoughts. But even on
this level of “pure” experience, patterns begin to
emerge and sorting processes begin. Some data
capture our attention and other data escape our
notice, or are noticed but immediately disregarded
or suppressed for some reason. Experiences run
the scale from the superficial and inconsequential
to those deemed rich and meaningful. But what is
the difference in these various types of
experiences and how does one account for the
wide range of experiences on the basic level of
conscious awareness?

Besides positive experiences that enrich our lives,
we all have negative experiences that can hold us
back in certain ways, cause us to withdraw from
further experiences or may be seen to otherwise
impoverish our lives in some small way, or
perhaps in very significant ways. This is jumping
ahead, though, since determining the negative or
positive experiences unfold on different level of
operation of consciousness. The point here,
however, is that we have all kinds of experiences
over which, initially, we have little control. As
“experiencers,” and in order to become better
experiencers, it is important to notice our
experiences—to be attentive to them. Lonergan
relates one’s noticing to what he calls a key
imperative, an initial, basic “transcendental
imperative,” namely, “be attentive.”
Lonergan’s account of experience, as noted,
centers on a recognition of experiences as a basic
level in the operations of human consciousness
that includes not only sensory experiences with
which we are all familiar, but also experiences of
intelligence and understanding, of discernment
and judgment, and experiences of deliberating and
deciding. These “data of consciousness,” in
addition to sensory data, often become present to
us in terms of how we “feel” about our thoughts
and ideas, our judging and our deciding. These
data of consciousness become more fully present
as we notice when and how they occur, what are
our personal circumstances that led to them, and
what conditions lead to similar experiences.
Lonergan sums up what is meant by “experience”
as a dimension or level in human consciousness
this way:
By consciousness is meant an awareness
immanent in cognitional acts. But such acts
differ in kind, and so the awareness differs in
kind with the acts. There is empirical
consciousness characteristic of sensing,
perceiving, imagining. As the content of these
acts is merely presented or represented, so the
awareness immanent in the acts is the mere
givenness of the acts.22
To explain further what is meant by “data of
consciousness,” an important aspect of
experiencing is what Lonergan calls “desire.” A
basic manifestation of desire appears as a drive
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that propels our consciousness forward in its
development. On the experiential level there is a
“desire to know” that anticipates the next level,
understanding, and even the level following that,
judging. But desire itself qualifies as an important
instance of experience. Lonergan states,
…[F]or the guiding orientation of the scientist
[as a paradigmatic knower] is the orientation of
inquiring intelligence, the orientation that of its
nature is a pure, detached, disinterested desire
simply to know. For there is an intellectual
desire, an Eros of the mind….23
Experience is not simply for the sake of
experience, but there is a higher intentionality
involved, namely, to experience the unfolding of
intelligence about what we experience. It is an
“Eros of the mind,” and not simply “Eros.” While
this “Eros of the mind,” is an experience, per se,
its intentionality anticipates understanding and
knowledge and as such, the desire to know
propels experience forward in one’s consciousness
as one seeks for and struggles with intelligibility of
our experiences. As such, experience and the
desire to know constitute so much of what
teaching and learning are about.
This desire to know is key to Lonergan’s
cognitional theory but there are many other drives
that unfold as one becomes a knower, a doer, a
lover. These also have great importance to
education, but since the desire to know is so
fundamental to consciousness and to learning
processes, it is important to give special attention
to this important aspect of our experiential lives.
“Experiencing” Related to Education
Education traditionally has been about primarily
learning various subjects. Certainly, in the Western
tradition, subject focus dominated education as far
back as medieval educational systems centered on
the Trivium consisting of grammar, logic and
rhetoric, and the Quadrivium covering arithmetic,
music, geometry and astronomy. How a subject
related to your experiences as a learner had little
consequence, although using the five senses was
important in the learning process. But what
remained most important was a student’s ability to
grasp intellectually what was needed to know
about a subject and to pass some examination or

achieve some recognized competency. As
educators came to critique this mode of education
they realized that students learn better, learn more,
and have a more enjoyable and rewarding learning
experience when a subject taught has deeper
relevance to their lives, when students can
experience in some way, directly or indirectly,
various dimensions of history, of biology, or of
whatever was being taught and studied. Education
began to incorporate more experiential and
experimental approaches to learning. Thus a new
direction in teaching and learning emerged known
as “progressive education.”
John Dewey, an early architect of experientiallybased education, explained the importance of
having “quality experiences” that are
“educationally worthwhile,” of valuing an
“experiential continuum” based on habits that
give rise to the formation of basic sensibilities and
“emotional and intellectual attitudes,” that lead to
“physical, intellectual and moral growth.”24 Dewey
brilliantly brought to the fore the foundation of
education grounded in the experience of students.
However, as a pragmatist and secularist (being
opposed to “organized religion”), Dewey’s
philosophical commitments were not well
developed in terms of the “spiritual” realm,
though he expressed a belief in the wholeness or
oneness of knowledge as a sense of the harmony
and mystery of the universe and our place in it.25
As such, Dewey recognized a religious or spiritual
aspect of human existence but his writings do not
explain in a salient or fuller way the
“transcendental drive” operative in human
consciousness, a drive that aims at a universal
viewpoint, and that energizes and upwardly directs
the world of human experience toward greater
meaning, broader realizations of existence, toward
things greater than oneself, and toward
transcendent being. For Dewey, religious
questions tended to be eclipsed by scientific
method and inquiry, and matters of the
transcendental and transcendence do not factor
much into the learning processes.
A philosophy of education that takes account
more fully of the Eros of mind and the drive
toward the transcendental, a philosophy that
addresses a broader horizon of human experience
encompassing the “unlimited,” conceives of
human experience in richer, more dramatic ways.
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Lonergan’s account of the structure and
operations of “experiencing” offers philosophy of
education new ways to address what counts as
experience—data of sense and data of
consciousness—and to redirect education to its
foundations beyond solely scientific methodology
to encompass transcendental methodology. This draws
attention not only to the subject matter being
studied, but to the nature of inquiry and studying
themselves, to the interior life, as it were, of the
questioning teacher and learner. Applying
Lonergan’s intentionality analysis to education,
educators and learners are called to be attentive to
their world of experience and to the process of
experiencing. Much more could be studied,
researched and written concerning Lonergan’s
account of experience and the relationship this has
to other dimensions of human consciousness. My
point simply is to acknowledge the basic,
fundamental importance of experience in
Lonergan’s thought26 and to suggest for
educational philosophy there is promise of a
deeper, richer field of inquiry this opens onto, one
more than simply sense experience.27

Have you ever thought about what a marvelous
experience it is to ask a question? In fact, asking
questions can be a truly exciting dimension of
being human. We are knowers, we are persons
who care, and we are lovers in various ways,
because we are question-askers. In effect,
question-asking affirms our existence uniquely as a
distinct mode of conscious beings-in-the-world.
When you ask a really good question, it can makes
you feel really good, perhaps even more so than
providing a really good answer. In asking a good
question, one often experiences a particular
exhilaration. One reason for this may be that
when we begin to ask questions, a fuller dynamism
of our consciousness starts to unfold. Our
consciousness is developing and expanding. As we
become better question askers, those good
questions pertain more directly and fully to our
experiences and bring about the possibility of
better answers and more satisfying insights.

Understanding
Human experiences occur and they readily fall
into patterns and those patterns of experience
tend to repeat. For instance, if you purchase a new
car, likely immediately you begin to notice every
other vehicle of that year, make and color you
pass on the road. Patterns of this experience may
broaden to where you notice other colors of that
model, other models of that maker, and models
with features that yours has, or now you wish your
car had. These patterns can lead to further
patterns of experiences that include feelings of
regret perhaps, or of satisfaction knowing you
made the right choice, and so forth. Why does this
happen? Lonergan explains that in the practical
world of daily living, and in the world of scientific
inquiry and of scholarship, our patterns of
experience naturally begin to repeat, our scope of
noticing expands considerably, and questions
related to our experiences move us to probe
possible meanings we attach to these experiences.
We begin to move from the level of experience to
a different, but certainly related, level of
consciousness, that of understanding.

George breaks most of the rules about
teaching: he rarely completes a sentence, often
turning an answer to a question into another
question…. [P]erhaps, above all, his propensity
to ask questions to answer a question, a
condition he was born with, makes him the
teacher he is. George’s questions become part
of your thinking. They tend to direct you,
what to read and which other teachers you
listen or talk to. His questions focus your
attention where you’ve not quite focused
before. George’s questions change you.28

As consciousness develops, we begin to wonder
about our experiences and start to ask questions.

Referring again to George Grant, a close associate
of his at McMaster University in Hamilton,
Ontario, Eugene Combs recalls,

Combs’s report captures well the role of the
question in education as it moves one from some
experience to expanding that experience, to a
broadening of one’s attention that anticipates
insight and understanding. Moving beyond our
experiences of various kinds, questions can lead to
understanding, and ultimately to transformation.
Early on in the process of coming to know, a
main goal in question-asking is to gain
understanding. Gaining understanding has been a
topic that has captured the attention of great
philosophers over the centuries. As noted in this
essay’s introduction, one recalls Hume’s An Inquiry
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Concerning Human Understanding and Kant’s three
great critiques (of “Pure Reason,” “Practical
Reason” and of “Judgment”). Much of Lonergan’s
work, but especially his chief philosophical work,
Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, pertains to
this field of inquiry.
Lonergan explains that understanding is achieved
as we seek to make sense of experience, first hand
(personal) experience and even second hand
(historical) experience of a family, a community, a
society. Understanding occurs as we piece things
together and create order out of the confusion and
disorder that our “pure” unmediated experiences
tend to be. Understanding begins to unfold when
the possible significance and meanings of things
are grasped. Meaning is what happens when the
patterns of experience are grasped or
conceptualized in some way, when ideas about
how the elements of our experience can be put
together and interrelated. Deeper meaning occurs
when greater levels and more complexities of
interrelations are discovered. Understanding is
the occurrence of insight, the grasping of
meaning, when we catch on intellectually to the
way things are or could be in relation to other
things. We have such acts of insight (acts of
understanding) all the time. Some of them are very
mundane, some largely unnoticed, or some may
prove to be dramatic, profound and life changing.
The key realization here, however, is not that we
have insights and understandings, but that there is
a structure and a process to them all. Lonergan
draws attention not so much to the content of the
question or of the answer, but to the types and
processes of questioning and answering. This
realization consists of “insight into insight,” of
grasping the dynamism at play in question-asking
and answer-finding processes. As is sometimes
said about Jesuit education, it is more about the
questions than the answers. For Lonergan this
tends to be the case, but his approach also
provides an account of a deep-level grasp of the
dynamism of the relation between the question
and the answer.
For Lonergan, the phenomenon of questionasking and answer-grasping, what is called
understanding, occurs as an intellectual “coming
to life,” as it were. It can occur in a moment, in a
flash of brilliance, when one “sees the light,”

when one “catches on.” Understanding can also
occur in a painstaking process of study and
intellectual struggle over weeks, months and even
years, leading to when an insight finally surfaces
and is fully grasped in one’s consciousness.
However it occurs, in solving a crossword puzzle,
in developing a unified field theory, or whatever,
an emotional experience can result—a sense of
satisfaction, an overwhelming exhilaration, or a
negative feeling if the insight is dreaded. In such
instances we see clearly how the levels of
experience and understanding interrelate and
promote the other. But then further questions can
surface, “Is this understanding really true?”, “Can
I be mistaken?”, and so forth, but these
subsequent questions pertain to the next level of
consciousness yearning to unfold.
Much could be said about Lonergan’s exposition
of this operation, this level of consciousness called
human understanding; he offers hundreds of
pages on this in his book, Insight. However, let us
consider Lonergan’s account of understanding,
presented here simply and much abbreviated, as it
related to educational philosophy.
“Understanding” Related to Education
An education that gives pride of place to insight
and understanding – and all good education at
some stage, in one way or another, does this –
concerns itself largely with the intellectual
development of the learner and achieving some
familiarity with a field of knowledge and perhaps
the acquisition of a skill set. Today, this may be
referred to as “literacy,” “competency,”
“proficiency,” and so forth. Such education was
championed in the last half of the 19th century and
into the 20th as “liberal” or “general” education,
and in the middle part of the 20th century as
“traditional education” (in part as a reaction
against “progressive education” that seemed
intellectually weak). The “Great Books”
programs, as an example of traditional education,
focuses primarily on understanding the canon of
Western thought. Education dominated by a
concern for understanding a field of study
manifests in schools designed for “training”
purposes, or on educating “professionals” of one
type or another. Recent popular movements in
education focusing on this second level of
intentionality are Constructivism and
Constructionism, the latter based largely on the
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thought and analysis of Jean Piaget. They assert
that we construct our own meanings and
understanding, and we construct the “products”
to be understood. (It should be noted that while
these movements focus on intellectual pursuits,
they also have relevance to the third and fourth
levels, judging and deciding, in that learning
involves finding solutions and justifying actions.29)
Whatever value understanding holds in education,
and though it does not encompass the whole story
since the drama of human consciousness, it
naturally obtains a central focus. “Insights are a
dime a dozen,” Lonergan says,30 and they occur all
the time. Some insights are great and profound
world-shaping illuminations. Others are mundane,
used merely to get your clothes on in the morning
or help put food on the table. Some insights seem
so true and compelling while others may be odd
or outlandish. In any case, additional questions
about insights, our alleged understandings, arise
(or should arise). Lonergan explains further the
nature of understanding.
By consciousness is meant an awareness
immanent in cognitional acts. But such acts
differ in kind, and so the awareness differs in
kind with the act…. But there is an intelligent
consciousness characteristic of inquiry, insight,
and formulation. On this level cognitional
process not merely strives for and reaches the
intelligible, but in doing so it exhibits its
intelligence; it operates intelligently. The
awareness is present but it is the awareness of
intelligence, of what strives to understand, of
what is satisfied by understanding, of what
formulates the understood, not as a schoolboy
repeating by rote a definition, but as one that
defines because he grasps why that definition
hits things off.31
While the content of what is understood is
important, note that Lonergan’s particular focus
centers on the intelligence about that
understanding. Accordingly, what is aimed at in
understanding covers not only what is achieved in
grasping intelligibility about something, but one
achieves a clear sense of why the intelligible is
intelligible. It allows, for instance, a person to
offer a definition or an expression of one’s
understanding in their own words.

As we allow—actually propel—our understanding
to develop and flourish, we are meeting the
second key “transcendental imperative,” “be
intelligent” in tandem with the first transcendental
imperative, “be attentive.”
Once we grasp an understanding of something,
further questions emerge about our understanding
a new mode of consciousness takes shape, a new
operation unfolds. The activities of one’s
consciousness, as it were, engage a different gear,
and the drive forward moves the quest of
knowledge to a different level, but this is for the
next section.
The focus in education and educational
philosophy on understanding and intelligence is
well-known, but Lonergan’s philosophy calls forth
a further dimension, namely a fuller understanding
of the nature of human inquiry and intelligence. It
requires an understanding of understanding, one
that shifts the focus from merely teaching and
learning an accepted canon of knowledge to
grasping the nature of intelligence itself
undergirding that canon.32 It allows the teacher
and the learner to expand upon that knowledge
base and to extend it and revise its new directions.
Bringing Lonergan’s philosophy to the table of
current discussion in educational philosophy,
certain connections can be made. For instance,
what contribution and critique could Lonergan
offer concerning Kieran Egan’s exposition of
mythic, romantic, philosophic and ironic modes of
understanding and their implications for
education?33 How could Lonergan’s exposition of
human understanding and consciousness be used
to interpret or critique Howard Gardner’s account
of multiple intelligences? How could both Egan’s
and Howard’s positions so influential in education
today be modified in helpful ways?34 In my
estimation, Lonergan probes more deeply, more
philosophically these questions of human
intelligence than do Egan or Gardner and discerns
a more generalized account of human
understanding. As such, Lonergan’s analysis
applies to a broader scope of educational concern
by encompassing not only the narrow educational
questions related to intelligence but to wider
educational concerns related to social theology,
the notion of human development, and ultimately
the questions of the meaning of life. And with
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these concerns, another level of human
consciousness comes to the fore.
Judging
As human consciousness develops in healthy,
developmental ways, we begin to wonder if our
insights or the insights of others are reasonably
accurate, solidly correct and can be counted as
“true,” or completely wrong-headed, or perhaps
something else along this continuum from wrong
to right, from bad to good. As we wonder about
insights and understandings, new questions arise
in the inquiring mind that propels one’s
consciousness to a whole new level. On this
further level, reflections, discernments,
assessments of the evidence, surface that then lead
to the making of judgments. And when a
judgment occurs, Lonergan states, depending on
the quality of that judgment, understanding may
be posited as “knowledge.”
Human beings, however, are not perfect creatures
and thus not perfect knowers. In fact, we are
prone to blind spots, to barking up the wrong
tree, so to speak, to seeing only what we want to
see and ignoring all sorts of factors that may turn
out to be important. We can adjust or correct
some of these shortcomings relatively easily and
quickly but others we cannot correct without a
great deal of honesty, effort and commitment, and
perhaps personal transformation in some measure.
Questions arise as to how we can make a needed
assessment, achieve desired discernment and
overcome the personal, group, or cultural issues
that may stand in our way. For Lonergan,
addressing these new and deeper questions
involves making good and better judgments. In
simplest terms, a good and true judgment about
something rests upon knowing how well some
particular understanding accounts for all the
relevant data in any given situation. These data,
again, are data of sense and data of consciousness
that include thoughts, feelings, ideas, perceptions,
and so forth, and we account for these
conceptually by grasping possible meanings and
obtaining understanding. Understanding, of
course, may be correct or incorrect, or some
gradation thereof, so surfaces the need and
intention of “judging,” an affirmation or a denial
of an understanding.

More specifically, on the level of judgment we
raise the question of how well the concepts and
suggested meanings we grasp have answered all
the questions that could be asked concerning
some particular experience, that is, about some set
of data. In the process of discerning and judging,
we return to some possible explanation that we
have settled upon, but then raise further questions
about how well the explanation accounts for the
data. In the process of judging, ideally all the
possible relevant questions about the data and
possible understandings are answered
satisfactorily. Increasingly the relevant questions
become fewer and fewer as satisfying answers are
attained. As questions diminish, an understanding
or explanation under scrutiny becomes more
“secure,” and we approach a moment when we
can make a sound judgment, “yes” or “no,”
“maybe,” or perhaps find that a judgment is still
not ready to be made (which is a judgment in its
own right). The probability that a judgment is true
can move closer and closer to confidence or
certainty if one is truly open to unrestricted
questioning. For Lonergan, this is key to the
judging process since there are myriad ways free
and open questioning can be blocked. He calls
these blockages “biases,” and they can take on
various forms.35 As this type of questioning
proceeds, Lonergan explains, at some point we
can reach what he calls grasping the “virtually
unconditioned.” That is to say, our answers and
our assertions no longer have unanswered
questions. All the relevant questions that can be
posed have been posed and they have been
answered in a satisfying way. We are at a place
where a reasonable judgment can be made, and in
a certain sense, we are compelled to make the
judgment in that not doing so may appear to be
unreasonable. When this occurs, not only do we
“understand” but we also “know.” If, however,
all relevant questions are not asked and answered
in a satisfying way, then we have something less
than true knowledge. Our knowing is “in part” as
St. Paul suggests, and our judgment may be
rendered in some degree of probability.
The result of making a sound judgment, Lonergan
argues, is achieving true “objectivity.” This type
of objectivity is not a matter merely of looking
“out there” to see what’s “real” to oneself, but
rather it is a matter of making a sound,
invulnerable judgment about our insights into the
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world or experience—the world of sense data and
the world of data of consciousness. As we have
seen, this can occur only when the full and, as
much as is possible, unimpeded operations of our
own consciousness unfold. So, objectivity for
Lonergan is not a matter of negating our
subjectivity that may, as some believe, taint or
skew “objectivity.” Rather, as Lonergan states,
“objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity.”36
Lonergan takes this a step further by suggesting
that when we truly know something, what we
know is the “real world.” Authentic knowledge is
not some illusion, not merely some set of
interesting ideas, not some “reality” that we have
created simply for ourselves, but it is discovering
in verifiable and reasonable ways what actually
exists. And we know this to be true because all the
relevant questions, in an unrestricted way, have
been answered so as to fully account for all the
relevant data. When questioning has reached this
level, we are compelled to affirm what is actually
so, what is “real.” Lonergan calls this method of
questioning and wrestling with the answers, and
then finally settling on what actually is the case,
“critical realism.” In Lonergan’s words,
By consciousness is meant an awareness
immanent in cognitional acts. But such acts
differ in kind, and so the awareness differs in
kind with the acts…. Finally, on the third level
of reflection, grasp of the unconditioned, and
judgment, there is rational consciousness. It is
the emergence and the effective operation of a
single law of utmost generality, the law of
sufficient reason, where the sufficient reason is
the unconditioned. It emerges as a demand for
the unconditioned and a refusal to assent
unreservedly on any lesser ground.37
It is on this level where the third “transcendental
imperative” is played out—“be reasonable.”
“Judging” in Educational Philosophy
“Judgment” has been a longstanding issue in
education. It surfaces especially in educational
traditions where the chief goal is “wisdom.”38
Wisdom remains an important focus in
educational theory and tends to span Lonergan’s
levels of judging and deciding.39 More recently,
questions of judgment appear in newer models of
education focused explicitly on what is commonly

called “critical thinking.” While educators today
have the mandate to teach critical thinking, one
might be hard-pressed to find a well-developed
philosophy of judgment associated with it. There
are guides and manuals that are used in the
classroom to promote critical thinking, but these
focus on problem solving, on ways to look at
situations, and help persons think more
reflectively and effectively.40 While focus seems
to be more on exercises and techniques than on a
larger view of how consciousness operates and
what it means to be a reasonable and wise human
being, Lonergan’s thought, however, offers exactly
this for educational philosophy.41
To be sure, there is much to recommend in this
now well-established field of curriculum
development and pedagogy centered on critical
thinking. John Chaffee’s “Preface” to his third
edition of Thinking Critically (1990) explains the
larger intention of the text as “based on the
assumption … that learning to think more
effectively is a synthesizing process, knitting
critical thinking abilities together with academic
content and the fabric of student’s experiences.
Thinking learned this way becomes a constitutive
part of who students are.”42 The larger vision of
critical thinking for Chaffee includes the crucially
important grasp of humanness, of values, a world
view, and the making of choices that forms one’s
world. He states further, “teaching people to
become critical thinkers does not mean simply
equipping them with certain intellectual tools; it
involves their personal transformation and its
commensurate impact on the quality of their lives
and those around them. This is truly education at
its most inspiring.”43 Indeed. The practical aim of
Chaffee’s book, however, is to provide guidance
for teachers to nurture and promote critical
thinking for students. Not being a text on
educational philosophy, these larger issues, this
grand vision and laudable assumptions are not
explicitly developed.
Some of these assumptions and philosophical
underpinnings of critical thinking, at least in part,
can be found in a much earlier text by W. H.
Werkmeister, An Introduction to Critical Thinking.44
While Chaffee envisions a larger relevance of
critical thinking to life in general, Werkmeister
explores the classic philosophical categories of
critical thinking, and in this regard, the
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connections of Lonergan’s notion of judgement to
critical thinking appear rather convincingly.
Werkmeister explains critical thinking in terms of
the “rational ideal,” this being, “the application of
critical habits of thought to all practical problems
of human existence, and the employment of
rational criteria in the evaluation of all opinion and
prospective beliefs.”45 Such thought processes for
Werkmeister are “proper subject matter for the
branch of inquiry known as Logic.”46 His rather
substantive text explores the dimensions and
functions of reason and rationality in relation to
logic traditionally understood, symbolic logic,
statistical method and affirmations of truth. In
Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, these are
questions of judgment.
In short, Werkmeister provides a thoroughgoing
account of critical thinking as the rational, reasondriven dimensions of human thought and Chaffee
offers practical strategies to incorporate these in
curriculum, but it is Lonergan who reveals a larger
framework that differentiates more fully the
distinctive rational operations of thought and how
these are integrated with other aspects of human
consciousness.
Critical thinking as it appears now in many
curricula in various ways ought to be championed,
but it seems to be lacking an explicitly developed
and fuller vision of what education ultimately
should entail—self-understanding, self-knowledge
and personal authenticity, each of which in
Lonergan’s thought stems from good judging. A
philosophy of education, in my view, could be
expanded in helpful ways by drawing on
Lonergan’s account of this third level of
intentionality, by providing more satisfying
opportunities and strategies for teachers and
learners to become good, better, more sound, and
trustworthy discerners and judgers—not only in
critically thinking about some field of academic
inquiry, but in other areas of one’s life. Both
Chaffee and Werkmeister suggest this, but in
discerning and judging, as Lonergan maps them
out, teachers and learners are propelled forward
through a deepening self-knowledge and the
promotion of effective caring for others and for
the world. This we see emerging more fully in the
next level of conscious intentionality, deciding.

Deciding
In Lonergan’s system of thought, once we become
good knowers (that is to say, “good judgers”—
since knowledge culminates in an act of sound
judgment), we also begin to catch on to what
knowing really is. Knowing is not merely having a
good look at something, or, as Lonergan says, not
a matter of merely grasping the “already out there
now real.”47 Understanding what really counts as
knowledge, and then knowing what knowing is,
for Lonergan truly makes all the difference in the
world for it commits one, and for educational
philosophy it commits the teacher and the learner,
to a life-time of being better experiencers, deeper
understanders, more careful and considered
judgers, and ultimately wise and responsible
deciders. This unfolds in education as we begin to
apply more intentionally and in better ways those
operations of consciousness to all aspects of life.
We begin to make our way in the world by
knowing what is truly good and deciding to make
good choices based on enriched experiences,
greater intelligence and sounder judgments. It is
what Aristotle calls “phronesis” (practical wisdom)
and what Alasdair MacIntyre and others champion
as “virtue ethics.”48
Basically, our consciousness takes on yet another
mode of operating when we are confronted with
the question of what to do about what we know.
The answer could be to do nothing, but that is an
answer nonetheless, or perhaps one actually
decides that some course of action is the “right”
or the “best” one to follow. The answer also
could be to wait, to hold off on acting, for any
number of reasons. As we operate on the level of
deciding and make our way in the world, we
become participants more fully in the life of the
family, a group, a society, a culture. On this level,
the moral and ethical dimensions of human life
come into play in the real world—questions of
how to treat others, how better to conduct oneself
in the world and how best to live one’s life in
accord with the good. One finds in their own
history the values that promote that which is true
and good. On the level of deciding, optimally, one
not only thinks about “the good” and that which
is “right,” but actually seeks to do “good,” do the
right thing, and advance the “common good.”
Lonergan explains human development in terms
of this level of consciousness.
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In fact, the emergence of the fourth level of
deliberation, evaluation, choice is a slow
process that occurs between the ages of three
and six. Then the child’s earlier affective
symbiosis with the mother is complemented by
relations with the father who recognizes in the
child a potential person, tells him or her what
he or she may and may not do, sets before him
or her a model of human conduct, and
promises to good behavior the later rewards of
the self-determining adult. So the child
gradually enters the world mediated by
meaning and regulated by values and, by the
age of seven, is thought to have attained the
use of reason. Still this is only the beginning of
human authenticity. One has to have passed
well beyond the turmoil of puberty before
becoming fully responsible in the eyes of the
law. One has to have found out for oneself
that one has to decide for oneself what one is
to make of oneself; one has to have proved
oneself equal to that moment of existential
decision; and one has to have kept on proving
it in all subsequent decisions, if one is to be an
authentic human person.49
On this level of deciding the fourth
“transcendental imperative” is played out—“be
responsible.”50
It is on this level that existential philosophy takes
its cue but tends, perhaps, to privilege the mere
act of deciding above all else. Notably,
existentialists Friedrich Nietzsche and Jean Paul
Sartre praised the heroic act of deciding in face of
the ultimate meaningless of life and the abyss
towards which all human existence is drawn.
Lonergan, however, as a different sort of
existentialist, stresses the importance of meaning
and reasonableness that lead to an existence
deemed “authentic,” one where the desire to
know and the marshalling of the full measure of
human consciousness expresses the transcendental
drive toward “transcendence.”
Deciding in Educational Philosophy
More than valuing equally all decision-making and
championing “courage” in making decisions in the
face of human destruction, as may be a position
for some existentialist philosophers, Lonergan’s
philosophy, and a philosophy of education that

would draw on it, prizes reasonable and
responsible decision-making that expresses, or
seeks to express, in the real world that which is
truly “good,” “right,” and “true.” In practical
terms, it is a philosophy of education that regards
moral development, a concern for peace and
justice, service to the community and citizenship
as integral to teaching and learning and to
personal development. Lonergan, being a Jesuit
philosopher,51 stressed the importance of the
decisional operations of human consciousness as a
set of distinct operations that unfold in terms of
highly differentiated but integrated sets of
cognitional acts that establish what counts as
knowledge generally, and what counts as
knowledge of “the good.” Persons are called
upon to “make the good world better”52 by
making decisions based on what counts as the
good and the right and the true, and seeing those
decisions actually lead to action.
Of course we find in educational theory and
philosophy expressions of this decisional level of
human consciousness. More often than not the
concern and focus in education centers on
meaning, understanding and interpretation, and
developing reasoning and critical skills. However,
one of the more popular recent movements in
educational theory, Constructionism, based largely
on the thought and analysis of Jean Piaget, brings
to the fore decision-making related to social
construction of the “physical” environment.”53 To
be sure, the movements of constructionism and its
companion theory in education, “Constructivism,”
are complex and multi-dimensional and build on
the notion that individuals create for themselves
their world of understanding and being. But with
the aid of Lonergan’s thought this concern has
been more deeply understood and critiqued,54 and
in particular, which is my contention, understood
better as arising from distinct intentionalities but
interrelated operations of conscious.
Perhaps the area of educational thought that more
clearly addresses the concrete world of human
affairs stems from political philosophy, and in
particular, the rather large topic of citizenship.
UNESCO defines citizenship education as
“educating children, from early childhood, to
become clear-thinking and enlightened citizens
who participate in decisions concerning society.
‘Society’ is here understood in the special sense of
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a nation with a circumscribed territory which is
recognized as a state.”55 Educational philosophy
has for decades, and longer, addressed citizenship
as a key aim whose purpose is to support
democracy and democratic institutions. The
underlying belief is that an uneducated population
threatens good collective decision-making.
One of the chief architects of social philosophy
today, John Rawls, was challenged in an influential
book by educational philosopher from Stanford
University, Eamonn Callan,56 in which he argues
against Rawls’ limited notion of justice and a
comprehensive liberalism in favor of a political
liberalism that values diversity, and within that,
autonomy and moral virtue rooted in
reasonableness and the ability to discern
“unreason.” Callan states, “… only to the extent
that we have thought seriously together about the
good life and the good society that we can expect
to find a common standpoint of justification that
deserves our allegiance.” 57 As citizens are charged,
then, not only to affirm what the good life and the
good society entails, citizens are then called by
Lonergan to decide and to act, to “be
responsible,” and to actually bring about the good.
Critique and Summary
It is a mistake to suggest that the various levels
and operations Lonergan elucidated are new to
educational philosophy. The opposite, in fact, is
the case. Many important themes and concerns in
educational philosophy relate to one of, or
combinations of, the four levels he has identified.
What’s new in Lonergan, I maintain, is his
thoroughgoing account of the differentiations of
the key elements of consciousness, and thus to
promise the ability to differentiate key elements of
education and educational philosophy. His grand
system of thought, as explained throughout his
writings, not only makes these differentiations but
also explains and advances the interrelations and
the integration of these differentiations. Thus is
promised also a way to grasp the interrelations and
integrations of various elements and expressions
of educational philosophy. Lonergan believed
that the four basic patterns of operations, of
experiencing, understanding, discerning and
deciding, are fundamental to everything human
beings know and do—whether or not we
acknowledge, understand or affirm them. When

we don’t acknowledge them, we operate in
“undifferentiated consciousness” and when we do
acknowledge and understand them, we operate in
“differentiated consciousness.” Undifferentiated
consciousness, to be sure, does have its successes,
but, Lonergan maintains, the conscious and
intentional human subject, for my purposes the
educator and the learner, operating in a mode of
differentiated consciousness can more fully and
authentically achieve one’s potentialities.
These operations of consciousness unfold in
response to various sets of questions related to
each of these four levels. In fact, it is the role and
function of “the question” to bring to light these
differentiations and to promote the operations of
consciousness to higher levels of integration.
Together, the operations of consciousness propel
us to new heights of discovery and learning, to a
more deeply grounded authenticity, where we in
ever greater degrees acknowledge who we are as
conscious, knowing and caring human beings, and
then operate explicitly in terms of that
acknowledgment. We become more authentic
knowers and doers as we unrestrictedly ask
questions concerning the four transcendental
imperatives of being attentive, intelligent,
reasonable and responsible. Moreover, Lonergan
has identified the broad lines of what human
beings achieve when individually and collectively
these levels and operations increasingly become
realized—as persons, as communities, as societies.
A new mode of existence comes into view when
we fully and profoundly become committed to
being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible
and loving. Although it is beyond the scope of
this essay to delve into the particularities of this
promise, still it could be an exciting exercise to
reflect on what the results could be for one’s own
life and the life of a community.
For the field of education, it is my contention that
these differentiated and integrated operations can
place education on a new, intriguing pathway.
First, there is the promise to place education on a
solid methodological, philosophical footing that
helps teachers and students achieve the most in
their formal studies and in life-long learning, and
helps educators realize greater integration of the
far too often isolated and imperialistic sets of
disciplines that appear in institutions of learning.
Second, Lonergan’s promise envisions an ability to
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understand a wide range of educational
philosophies that often are seen to be at odds, but
can be seen to be complementary within the larger
framework of consciousness differentiations and
their interrelations. Third, with Lonergan there is
the promise to critique these philosophies by
showing in what ways they may be only partial
perspectives and limited solutions in an education
that demands a more comprehensive approach
and engagement. And fourth, a Lonerganian
approach to education can help bring persons and
communities to greater realizations of the
common good and to greater expressions of
authentic existence, and to benefit by new
dimensions of self-knowledge and a deeper
knowledge of the world in which we live.
Ultimately, there is the promise to enable
educators to wrestle with the questions of ultimate
meaning and reality in more confident and
compelling ways.
In recommending the promise Lonergan holds for
education and educational philosophy, I offer
some pause for thought. These take the form of a
few questions that for me remain still
unaddressed. Does Lonergan rely too heavily on
the scientific paradigm for understanding
completely what counts as knowing (as would be
the complaint of George Grant referred to earlier),
and if so, precisely in what ways is Lonergan’s
account of the structure and operations of human
consciousness limited? What then might be the
correctives? Are there other types of knowing
beyond Lonergan’s cognitional theory that are
legitimate but which reveal variant structures and
processes of consciousness? I am reminded of the
work of Temple Grandin on the autistic brain and
that thinking and “knowing” consist primarily of
pictures rather than words and concepts, and
occur as single instances of knowledge rather than
a cumulative process of experiencing,
understanding and judging endemic to empirical
method.58 Is Lonergan’s account general enough
to accommodate elements of human knowing
outside of the empirical paradigm? Does
educational research demonstrate the effectiveness
and value of mapping a broad approach to
education based on the structure and operations
of human consciousness? Does it follow that,
simply because our consciousness operates in an
invariant pattern, education should (or optimally)
follow this pattern? Could the argument be made

that education occurs not as an operation of a
single consciousness but rather as an interplay of
various “consciousnesses,” as contended by
Gardner and Egan. Moreover, where
intersubjectivity occurs– as it does dramatically in
education with students and teachers in myriad
ways—does intersubjectivity also engage the same
general structure and operations as personal
subjectivity, or are there different, equally
fundamental, elements of human consciousness
that come into play in person-to-person and group
dynamics?
As Lonergan suggests of the nature of human
consciousness, further questions arise, and these
are some of mine. Answers to any of these
questions may perhaps not prove to be
detrimental or devastating to Lonergan’s promise
to education mapped out in this essay; they may in
fact prove to be additional support for this
particular approach. But these, and probably a
host of other questions, still need to be asked,
probed and answered satisfactorily. At the end of
the day, however, it is probably safe to say that in
whatever ways education can be enhanced by a
deepened, enriched and enlivened experiencing,
understanding, discerning and judging, and by
bringing greater clarity and wisdom to one’s
deciding, then that expression of education is on a
right track. This is to say that education would do
well, practically and philosophically, to appropriate
in more intentional ways these differentiated yet
interrelated operations and thus begin to realize
Lonergan’s promise to education.
There also is a final cautionary note I mention
specifically related to the promise suggested here
of Lonergan—that this is a rather preliminary,
sketchy, and by no means a broadly-based account
of the myriad applications Lonergan’s thought can
have for education, and many further dimensions
could, and at some point should, be explored,
such as his notion of the “self-correcting process
of learning,” his notion of development, and his
notion of a new social order, “cosmopolis.”
These are for another time. The aim of this essay
has been admittedly modest, simply seeking to
introduce educators to an important mind of the
20th century, and to indicate what I believe
applications of his thought have for education
today and tomorrow.
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